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Kule 40 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 98 
equity case, the jury will serve only in an advi- waived, as by proceeding to trial before a jury. 
sory capacity unless both parties have clearly Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler. 47 
consented to accept a jury verdict. Romrell v. Utah 215, 152 P. 726 (1915). 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah —Waiver of jury trial. 
1980). Where it did not appear that any demand for 
Trial court did not commit prejudicial error
 a j u r y t r i a l w a s m a d e o r t h a t ^ y objection or 
by allowing a jury to sit in an equity proceed- exception was made at any time during trial 
ing where the jury was retained merely as an
 a g a i n s t right 0f the court to try the case with-
advisory jury to consider the sole question of
 o u t a jury, it would be presumed on appeal that 
the reasonableness of plaintiffs reliance on de-
 a t r i a l by jury was waived. Perego v. Dodge, 9 
fendant's act. Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Pav-
 U t a h 3 33 p 22l (1893), aff d, 163 U.S. 160, 16 
ing & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984).
 s C t 9 7 1 > 4 1 L Ed> 1 1 3 ( 1 8 9 6 ) 
Trial by consent Trial by jury. 
—Equity. —Grant of jury trial. 
Motion for directed verdict Absence of demand. 
Where the case was essentially one in equity Court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
but the parties and court appeared to have con- jury trial to defendant, under this rule, over 
sented to presenting their case to a jury whose plaintiffs objections although defendant had 
verdict would have "the same effect as if trial not made proper demand for jury trial under 
by jury had been a matter of right," under Sub- Rule 38, where plaintiff was not prejudiced 
division (c), the determination of whether a di- thereby. James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
rected verdict was proper was to be tested by 210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964). 
the same rules governing cases at law. Willard —Right 
M M " " * Inv. Co. v. Cox, 580 P.2d 607 (Utah ^
 d f l e a c t i o n 
This rule gives the right to have any legal 
Trial by court issue of fact tried by a jury upon proper de-
Waiver of bench trial. mand, and plaintiff in an action to quiet title to 
Even though former statute providing for mining claims was entitled to a jury trial on 
trial by court in absence of demand for jury issues of fact. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 
was couched in mandatory terms, and a party 327 p.2d 250 (1958). 
might have an absolute right to have the is- Cited in Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 
sues tried by the court, the right could be 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 57, of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authoriz-
58; 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 714 et seq. ing it to order jury trial notwithstanding 
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 98 to 105; 88 party's failure to make seasonable demand for 
C.J.S. Trial §§ 20, 203, 547 et seq. j u r y , 6 A.L.R. Fed. 217. 
A.L.R. — When does jeopardy attach in a Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 25; Trial *=> 10, 
non-jury trial, 49 A.L.R.3d 1039.
 1 3 4 ) 3 6 7 e t s e q . 
Discretion of district court under Rule 39(b) 
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for 
the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties 
or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such 
other manner as the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute. 
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may in 
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of 
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon 
good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of 
evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence 
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to 
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the continuance to 
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if 
the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and 
that it may be considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and ex-
cluded as improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the adverse 
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have 
the testimony of any witness present taken, in the same manner as if at the 
trial; and the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same 
99 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 40 
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made with respect to a 
deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32 (c)(3)(A) and 
(B)]. 
Compiler's Notes. — Following the amend-
ment of Rule 32, effective January 1, 1987, the 
reference to Rule 32(c)(1) and (2), at the end of 
Subdivision (c), should now be to Rule 
32(c)(3)(A) and (B). 
ANALYSIS 
Postponement. 
—In general. 
—Absence of party. 
—Discretion of court. 
—Inability of counsel to attend trial. 
Unavoidable absence. 
—New theory of case. 
—Procedural delays. 
—Supporting affidavits. 
—Unavailable witness. 
Lack of diligence. 
Need. 
Cited. 
Postponement. 
—In general. 
To grant one party continuance after contin-
uance to the prejudice of the other party would 
be patently unfair. This is especially true when 
such continuances are being granted to the 
plaintiff who has triggered the time con-
straints of litigation by bringing the suit in the 
first place. It is equally unfair to allow a party 
to name new witnesses several days before 
trial. Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
—Absence of party. 
Continuance would not be granted because 
of absence of a party, unless he was a material 
witness, and, if so, the facts expected to be 
proved by him had to be stated under oath, 
unless the oath was waived. It was also neces-
sary that party had used due diligence to be 
present at the trial. McGrath v. Tallent, 7 
Utah 256, 26 P. 574 (1891). 
Refusal of trial court to postpone trial was 
not abuse of discretion where case was set 
down for trial, and had once before been con-
tinued because of absence of party who was 
principal witness, and second continuance was 
sought by attorney who was not of record in 
case. Lancino v. Smith, 36 Utah 462, 105 P. 
914 (1909). 
Refusal to grant continuance in personal in-
jury case was an abuse of discretion where 
plaintiff was not able to attend the trial be-
cause of his physical condition, there was no 
evidence of malingering by the plaintiff, and 
the plaintiffs testimony was essential to his 
case. Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 
P.2d 375 (1962). 
—Discretion of court. 
Denial of motion for continuance was within 
discretion of trial court. Sharp v. Canakis 
Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 P. 337 (1924). 
Trial courts have substantial discretion in 
deciding whether to grant continuances. 
Subdivision (a) of this rule is similar to Rule 
40, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amendment of plead-
ings to conform to evidence, continuance upon, 
U.R.CP. 15(b). 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
1988). 
—Inability of counsel to attend trial. 
The inability of counsel to be present at the 
time set for trial does not necessarily entitle 
his client to a continuance. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Unavoidable absence. 
When counsel has made timely objections, 
given necessary notice, and has made a reason-
able effort to have the trial date changed for 
good cause, it would be an abuse of discretion 
not to grant a continuance. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
—New theory of case. 
Continuance could be obtained to develop a 
theory of the case suggested after issue joined 
and before trial. Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah 
393 (1877). 
—Procedural delays. 
Court properly denied motion for contin-
uance in action based on credit card obligation 
which had been procedurally delayed for two 
and a half years by interrogatories and by vari-
ous motions of the defendant: and although 
trial date had been set for four months, motion 
for continuance was not filed until nine days 
before trial. First Sec. Bank v. Johnson, 540 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1975). 
—Supporting affidavits. 
Subdivision (b) does not require affidavits to 
accompany a motion for continuance. Bairas v. 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962). 
—Unavailable witness. 
Lack of diligence. 
Where subpoena for absent witness was not 
placed in hands of an officer for service until 
the morning the case was called for trial, 
though it had been set for several weeks, and 
the witness had testified at a former trial, con-
tinuance was denied. Corporation of Members 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Watson, 30 Utah 126, 83 P. 731 (1906). 
In malpractice action, motion for contin-
uance based on plaintiffs inability to serve 
subpoena on vacationing medical witness was 
properly denied, where plaintiff had made no 
effort to depose witness and had never con-
tacted witness for the purpose of testifying. 
Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 
1975). 
After plaintiff had been granted one contin-
uance because of unavailability of her pre-
ferred expert witness, and her second request 
for a continuance several months later was 
solely due to her own failure to retain and des-
ignate a new expert witness in a timely man-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Tab 2 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 146 
set aside must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on 
that issue. Downey State Bank v. Major-
Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). 
—Setting aside proper. 
Where plaintiff served defendant with a 
summons, and left a copy with the defendant 
which was not the same as the original, the 
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion 
was created so that a motion to set aside the 
default judgment should have been granted 
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 
from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
ment, rather than from the date of judgment. 
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)». 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56- Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
xuue oo 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
L. DIANE TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CRAIG H. MCQUEEN, M.D., and 
UTAH ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES 
& SPORTS MEDICINE CLINIC, 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CIVIL NO. 910903939 
A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 
4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with 
defendants/ Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's Motion 
for Extension of Time to Designate an Expert, the Court having 
reviewed the Motions, Affidavits and Memorandum in support and 
Reply Memorandum and the Memorandum in opposition, and the 
relevant law and being fully advised and finding good cause, 
rules as stated herein. 
The plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Designate 
Expert was made on or about September 21, 1992. The cut-off 
time for designation of experts was July 31, 1992. The 
discovery cut-off was October 9, 1992. Dr. Home's 
000152 
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letter to plaintiff's counsel is dated September 11, 1992. The 
trial in this matter is set for November 3 0 and has been since 
July 20, 1992. The Court finds given these dates that the 
Motion is not timely or well-taken and denies the same. 
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
The Court finds there are no material issues of fact precluding 
Summary Judgment as a matter of law. The law requires 
plaintiff to establish a violation of the medical standard of 
care by expert testimony and the plaintiff's designated expert, 
Dr. Home, indicates he will not testify as to such a 
violation. Therefore, plaintiff cannot meet its burden of 
proof. 
000153 
Tab 4 
DAVID W. SLAGLE (A2975) 
ELIZABETH KING (A4863) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Craig 
H. McQueen, M.D. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
L. DIANE TURNER, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CRAIG H. MCQUEEN, M.D., and 
UTAH ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES & 
SPORTS MEDICINE CLINIC 
Defendants. 
This matter having been submitted for ruling pursuant to 
Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's Motion 
for Extension of Time to Designate an Expert, the Court, having 
reviewed the Motions, Affidavits and Memorandum in support and 
the Memorandum in Opposition, and the Reply Memorandum, and the 
relevant law, and being fully advised, and finding good cause, 
rules as follows: 
mJXePSTSPSTSSSIIT 
T.f - - !r ' :o-s! District 
DEC 1 7 1992 
Dbpuiy Clerk 
Civil No. 910903939PI 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
000155 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This is a medical malpractice case arising out of 
arthroscopic knee surgery rendered to L. Diane Turner by Dr. 
Craig McQueen on June 19, 1989. 
2. On August 10, 1989, plaintiff served a Notice of Intent 
to Commence a Malpractice Action against Dr. McQueen. 
3. On August 23, 1989, plaintiff filed a Request for 
Prelitigation Review alleging that the respondents owed a duty to 
L. Diane Turner to treat and care for her in a manner that was 
consistent with the standards of the medical community in which 
they practice and that said respondents failed in their duty to 
properly treat and care for L. Diane Turner. 
4. A prelitigation screening panel hearing was held as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (1953 as amended) on 
November 2, 1989. 
5. A Summons and Complaint was served on defendants on June 
24, 1991, and an Answer was timely filed. 
6. Interrogatories were served by defendants on July 2, 
1991, and a Second Set of Interrogatories specifically seeking 
information as to expert witnesses were served on January 29, 
1992. 
7. In response to the Second Set of Interrogatories, 
plaintiff identified Robert Home, M.D. as the only expert 
witness prepared to testify regarding the standard of care. 
-2-
000156 
8. In addition, defendants took the plaintiff's deposition 
on January 24, 1992, at which time she testified that Dr. Home 
had never expressed any criticism of the care rendered by Dr. 
McQueen. 
9. On the Court's own motion, a scheduling conference was 
held on July 20, 1992. During that scheduling conference the 
parties agreed to the following dates: (a) Plaintiff's witnesses 
(expert and otherwise) to be designated on July 31, 1992; (b) 
Defendants' expert witnesses (expert and otherwise) to be 
designated on August 10, 1992; (c) Discovery cut-off October 9, 
1992 and (d) four-day jury trial set for November 30, 1992. 
10. On July 31, 1992, plaintiff designated Dr. Robert Home 
as the only medical expert witness prepared to testify on her 
behalf. 
11. On August 7, 1992, defendants designed their experts 
and other medical witnesses. 
12. On September 11, 1992, defendants moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds plaintiff failed to produce competent 
expert testimony necessary to prevail on her medical malpractice 
claim. Specifically, the evidence before the court was that the 
expert allegedly designated by the plaintiff, Dr. Robert Home, 
had refused to testify on her behalf, and in fact believed the 
standards of care to have been met by the defendants. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by 
Affidavits from both Dr. Home and Dr. Sherman Coleman. 
-3-
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13. On September 21, 1992, plaintiff filed a Motion in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and moved 
for an extension of time in which to designate an expert witness, 
based on Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). 
14. On September 23, 1992, defendants filed a Reply 
Memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
15. Further pleadings ensued, including a response to 
defendants1 Reply, a Supplemental Memorandum in support of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and an Affidavit filed by Elizabeth 
King. The matter was submitted for decision pursuant to Rule 4-
501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
16. There is no evidence that the plaintiff or her attorney 
confirmed that Dr. Home would act as her expert witness, 
testifying that the standard of care was not met by the defendant 
Dr. McQueen. The evidence indicates that Dr. Home first learned 
that he had been appointed in this role when the defendants1 
attorneys called him to schedule his deposition. 
17. The irrefuted evidence indicates Dr. Home objected to 
being designated as an expert witness and claimed he was not 
critical of the care rendered. Further, there is no evidence 
before the Court that Dr. Home had changed his mind or his 
position with regard to this question; he had simply never been 
asked to be plaintiff's expert witness. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the 
following 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This action is a medical malpractice action against a 
health care provider which is governed by case law requiring 
expert testimony establishing a deviation from requisite 
standards of care which resulted in harm to the plaintiff. 
2. This Court finds as a matter of law that there is 
insufficient evidence before the Court to support a prima facie 
claim against the defendants and, therefore, plaintiff cannot 
meet her burden of proof. Specifically, plaintiff's designated 
expert Dr. Home, indicates he will not testify as to a violation 
of the medical standard of care. Without such testimony, 
plaintiff's Complaint fails as a matter of law and defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time to Designate 
an Expert is untimely and is not well-taken in that the Motion 
was filed a full six weeks after the cut-off time for plaintiff's 
designation of experts. The Motion for an Extension is not 
supported by the facts or by case law. Plaintiff triggered the 
time constraints by filing her Notice to Commence a Medical 
Malpractice Claim against defendants. She had ample time and 
ample forewarning that she was required to produce expert 
testimony regarding the standard of care, a prima facie element 
of her case in chief. The Court finds and hereby holds that 
defendants should not be required to bear the burden of 
plaintiff's laxity, and finds no basis for a continuance. 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, as well as on the pleadings before the Court, the Court 
denies the plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time to 
Designate an Expert Witness, and grants the defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and orders that plaintiff's Complaint be, 
and the same is hereby, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, with each party to bear its 
own costs. ^ L 
DATED this / / day of December,^ 1! 
BY THE COURTS 
iieslie A. 
Third Distri 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
J. Ray Barrios 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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class, postage prepaid, on the &7 day of June, 1993 to: 
J. Ray Barrios, P.C. 
First American Title Building 
330 East 400 South, Sute 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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<£Z^£b& 
^ a v i d w. Slagl( e 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Appellees 
